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**1969/02/18**



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 18, 1969 5/8/69

TO: J - Ambassador Johnson

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EA - Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown

SUBJECT: Kreisberg Action in Warsaw - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. Paul Kreisberg called from Frankfurt before noon today. He is going to Warsaw, arriving at 1:30 p.m. today Washington time. Preliminary to talking with Ambassador Stoessel, he recommends:

a) That he personally deliver to the Chinese Embassy the letter on the prisoners, copy attached at Tab A.

b) That he at that time talk to the Chinese along the lines of the McCloskey statement (Tab B) and press the Chinese to give us some indication of their intentions regarding the Warsaw meetings.

2. I told Paul that I was sympathetic, tentatively, to this plan. We agreed that he and Ambassador Stoessel would telegraph a proposal to the Department after discussing it this afternoon. We would then send instructions.

3. I think Kreisberg's plan is a good one.

a) Despite the cancellation of the February 20 meeting, we still should deliver the letter to the Chinese on the prisoners and missing Americans. Public pressure for U.S. Government action on the prisoners' behalf, and on behalf of Lt. Dunn and other missing men, makes some action by us virtually mandatory.

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b) Kreisberg's personal delivery of the letter will underline for the Chinese, on the one hand, the importance we attach to this issue and will underline for U.S. relatives, on the other, that the Department is losing no opportunity to act on the men's behalf. We of course could have a Warsaw Embassy officer deliver the letter, or even have Ambassador Stoessel personally do so. Letting Kreisberg deliver, however, seems to me to strike a good balance and has a flavor of direct personal action by the Department.

c) By using the letter's delivery as a reason for the visit, Kreisberg can discuss the broader subject of the ambassadorial meetings without as great a risk of forcing the Chinese to respond negatively.

d) By using the letter as an excuse, it will be more of an incidental conversation and give less of an impression of our "begging" the Chinese to resume the meetings.

e) Kreisberg's conversation, although it almost certainly will not result in any immediate Chinese response, may make them more receptive regarding a new meeting and may even help to forestall continued Chinese attacks related to cancellation of this meeting.

f) Finally, I am very confident of Kreisberg's ability to handle this meeting skillfully.

4. I expect we will be receiving Warsaw's recommendation about this meeting by tomorrow morning, and I will consult with you then about our reply.

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter re prisoners *state* 24903

Tab B - Statement by Mr.  
McCloskey

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CONTINGENCY STATEMENT

We are disappointed that the Chinese Communists cancelled the meeting scheduled in Warsaw for Thursday.

We especially regret this action inasmuch as our representative had been instructed to make or renew constructive suggestions. These suggestions included consideration of an agreement on peaceful coexistence consistent with our treaty obligations in the area, the subjects of exchange of reporters, scholars, scientists and scientific information, the regularization of postal and telecommunications problems.

We continue to stand ready to meet with the Chinese Communists at any time.

The charges made by the Chinese Communists that the United States had engineered the defection of Liao Ho-Shu are untrue.